Should governments implement policies that affect fertility decisions on efficiency grounds? What is the correct notion of efficiency to use? To address these issues, this paper develops an extension of the notion of Pareto efficiency, referred to as Millian efficiency, to evaluate symmetric allocations in an overlapping generations setting with endogenous fertility. This extension is based on preferences of those agents who are actually alive, and exclusively allows for welfare comparisons of symmetric allocations. First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine whether an allocation is Millian efficient or not, and we show that the sufficient conditions for dynamic efficiency offered by Cass (1972) and Balasko and Shell (1980) cannot be directly applied when fertility decisions are endogenous. Second, we characterize Millian efficient allocations as the equilibria of a decentralized price mechanism, and we present a sufficient condition for dynamic efficiency that uses the sequence of prices associated to such decentralized equilibria. Finally, we analyse how intergenerational policies should be designed to restore efficiency and achieve net welfare gains in two different settings in which markets yield inefficient allocations: dynamic inefficiencies and financial market incompleteness regarding human capital. In the former, a pay-as-you-go social security system eliminates dynamic inefficiencies, provided pensions are explicitly linked with fertility decisions. In the latter, a specific link between social security and public education becomes a necessary condition for Millian efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
Economists like to believe that individuals take rational and optimal fertility decisions. However, those decisions may result in resource misallocations at the aggregate level, an issue that concerns governments and international institutions worldwide. High fertility rates are often considered an obstacle to economic development, and Third World governments are advised to introduce birth control methods as a way to increase the wealth of their nations. On the other hand, as the Western population ages, the financial foundations of pay-as-yougo state-pension systems are beginning to crumble, and policymakers are envisioning policies that increase fertility rates. Furthermore, the provision of tax breaks or direct transfers as a function of the number of children have become popular policies around Europe, while policies consisting of linking pension benefits to the number of children have also been discussed.
Despite these concerns, the literature has not yet provided sufficient theoretical grounds to determine the optimal size of the population and, consequently, to determine whether individual fertility choices lead to a population that is too large or too small. The main reason for this is that the standard Pareto-dominance criterion underlying the notion of Pareto efficiency exclusively allows one to rank allocations for which the set of agents is fixed. Therefore, any two allocations associated with different fertility choices cannot be compared.
A first main objective of this paper is to fill this gap by developing a notion of efficiency, which we refer to as Millian efficiency, applicable for evaluating equilibrium allocations in an overlapping generations framework with endogenous fertility decisions and capital accumulation. 1 In our model: (i) all living agents of a given generation have the same preferences on consumption bundles, represented by a well-behaved utility function; (ii) children are a costly consumption good, and parents derive utility from the number of children they bear, but not from the utility of their descendants; and (iii) fertility choices are selected from a continuum.
In this setting, the notion of Millian efficiency results from combining:
(a) an extension of the Pareto-dominance criterion, referred to as the A-dominance criterion, which ranks any two allocations of different population size by comparing exclusively the welfare profiles of those agents who are alive in the two allocations; and (b) a constraint on the set of allocations that can be compared using the A-dominance criterion, formed by all feasible allocations in which (1) two living agents with equal preferences and endowments are treated equally (i.e., symmetrically), and therefore any two agents of the same generation obtain the same consumption bundles; and (2) the population size of each generation is strictly positive.
To be more precise, a Millian efficient allocation is a symmetric allocation with positive fertility rates that is not A-dominated by any other symmetric allocation that also yields positive fertility rates. Although other names (such as, for example, constrained A-efficiency) might be more informative of the normative principles underlying this notion of efficiency, we use the term Millian efficiency because it generalizes a notion of optimality, referred to as Millian optimality, frequently appearing in models with endogenous fertility. This criterion might be regarded as a form of utilitarianism, called average utilitarianism and associated with John Stuart Mill, which postulates that welfare judgments involving different generations should be independent of the population size of each generation (see Razin and Sadka, 1995, ch. 5 ).
Once we adopt this extension of the notion of Pareto efficiency, we explore its properties in the framework studied in the paper. First, we obtain a set of necessary conditions to achieve Millian efficiency, which in addition to those associated with Pareto efficiency impose that the rate of return to investments in physical capital must be equal to the rate of return to investments in children. We also show that an allocation satisfying these necessary conditions is statically Millian efficient, i.e., it cannot be improved upon by a reallocation of resources of a finite number of generations, although it might not be fully Millian efficient (or dynamically Millian efficient) . Thus, it might be improved upon by a reallocation of resources involving an infinite sequence of intergenerational transfers. The distinction between static and dynamic efficiency 1. For references of papers using models close to ours to study the determinants of the equilibrium path for population and the relation between social security policies and fertility choices, see, e.g., Becker (1960) , Nerlove, Razin and Sadka (1982) , Eckstein and Wolpin (1985) , Cigno (1992 Cigno ( , 2006 , Raut (1992) , Groezen, Leers and Medjam (2003) , Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2005) or Michel and Wigniolle (2007) . also appears in overlapping generation economies with exogenous fertility (see Balasko and Shell, 1980) ; however, considering fertility as an endogenous decision induces non-convexities in the sequence of inequalities characterizing the set of feasible allocations. Due to these nonconvexities, the standard criterion for dynamic efficiency found by Phelps (1965) , Koopmans (1965) and Diamond (1965) -which imposes that the long-run interest rate exceeds the rate of population growth-or the complete characterizations of dynamically efficient allocations obtained by Cass (1972) or Balasko and Shell (1980) , are no longer valid to identify efficient paths. In view of this, we provide a sufficient condition for dynamic efficiency that takes into account non-convexities introduced by the fact that fertility is endogenous.
Next, endowed with the necessary tools to determine what fertility choices might be considered efficient, we explore under what conditions decentralized decisions lead to efficient choices. To do this, we adapt the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics to a setting with endogenous fertility by characterizing every (statically) Millian efficient allocation as the equilibrium of a decentralized sequential price mechanism. Analogously to the case of Pareto efficiency in economies with exogenous population, every Millian efficient allocation can be decentralized by initially selecting an appropriate sequence of intergenerational transfers-enforced by an external authority-and by allowing the agents to determine their consumption and investment decisions in competitive markets. Yet, unlike the standard exogenous population case, in which these non-distorting intergenerational transfers must be lump-sum for all agents, an incentive scheme that links intergenerational transfers with fertility decisions is needed. More precisely, for every system of intergenerational transfers that achieves Millian efficiency, every middle-aged adult has to pay a lump-sum tax (or, in some cases, receive a lump-sum subsidy), while every old adult has to receive a subsidy (or pay a tax) that depends linearly on the number of children she decided to have. Such an incentive scheme is needed because, in the presence of intergenerational transfers, children become an investment good and static efficiency imposes that the rate of return to all investments must be equal. As a particular case, we show that the allocation corresponding to a laissez-faire equilibrium in which all mandatory transfers are zero is also statically Millian efficient.
As in other overlapping generations environments, this version of the two Welfare Theorems holds for static efficiency. Although a version of the Welfare Theorems for the dynamic notion of Millian efficiency would be of interest, dynamic efficiency of a given equilibrium depends on preferences and technologies rather than on the specific pattern of intergenerational transfers. Still, we provide a simple sufficient condition for dynamic efficiency that replaces the standard criterion by Phelps (1965) , Koopmans (1965) and Diamond (1965) , and states that the rate of return to physical capital should be higher than the (highest) rate of return to investments in children, measured by the ratio of wages to (minimum) costs of rearing children.
To conclude the paper, we make use of the results to discuss how fertility policies and intergenerational policies should be designed to restore Millian efficiency and achieve welfare gains in different institutional settings in which market equilibria are inefficient. We distinguish two main sources of market failure: dynamic inefficiencies and financial market incompleteness, an institutional failure which is likely to occur in economies with human capital. Although these two sources of market failure have also been explored in frameworks with exogenous fertility, the policy instruments offered in those settings to restore efficiency differ significantly from the ones suggested here. For instance, a standard, pay-as-you-go social security system that eliminates dynamic inefficiencies and achieves Pareto improvements when fertility is exogenous becomes an inadequate policy instrument in our setting, unless pension benefits are explicitly linked to fertility decisions. Analogously, when social security and public education are introduced to eliminate the inefficiencies arising from incomplete markets, restoring efficiency in our setting requires establishing a specific link between these two intergenerational policies and fertility decisions. In the exogenous fertility literature a link between social security and public education is justified either as a means to restore the complete market allocation (Boldrin and Montes, 2005) or as a means to eliminate time consistency problems in the provision of education (Rangel, 2003) . In our setting, such a link is a necessary condition for Millian efficiency.
The fact that pensions must be linked to fertility decisions provides some intuition as to why the Phelps-Koopmans-Diamond criterion may fail to identify dynamically efficient paths when fertility decisions are endogenous. In a steady state, the ratio n/R provides a measure of the ratio of marginal benefits n to marginal costs R obtained by an agent if it is introduced a policy mandating intergenerational transfers to the elderly (e.g., a social security programme). In an exogenous fertility setting, n is fixed and R increases as the size of social security increases. Therefore, starting from a stationary allocation satisfying condition R > n, which ensures that marginal benefits are lower than marginal costs, it is enough to establish that any additional contribution to a social security programme decreases welfare. However, things are different when fertility is endogenous. In this case, the ratio of marginal benefits to marginal costs of increasing contributions to a fertility-related social security programme might increase as contributions to such a programme are higher. This is possible because n is now endogenous and might be higher as intergenerational transfers to the elderly increase, since these transfers make children more valuable. Thus, even if one starts from an allocation in which R − n > 0, so that marginal costs of increasing intergenerational transfers to the elderly exceed marginal benefits, the difference may become negative as we move away from the margin and increase intergenerational transfers by a sufficiently high amount.
The approach followed in this paper differs significantly from the existing literature of overlapping generations economies with endogenous fertility. Most of this literature has followed two different approaches to provide normative principles. A first approach identifies socially optimal allocations with steady state optimal allocations (also referred to as golden rule allocations), that is, allocations that maximize the utility obtained by a representative consumer among those feasible stationary allocations. 2 A second approach identifies optimal allocations with those maximizing a certain class of social welfare maximization problems, referred to as Millian or Benthamite depending on whether or not the welfare weight given to a generation in the social welfare function depends on the size of that generation.
3 Neither one of these two approaches takes explicitly into account the problem of dynamic efficiency, or the fact that the standard Pareto criterion is not directly applicable to environments in which the set of agents is endogenous.
Two interesting exceptions within the literature of endogenous fertility are the papers by Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007) and Michel and Wigniolle (2007) . Golosov et al. consider a general dynamic economy and propose two extensions of the Pareto criterion to compare allocations with different population size, referred to as A-dominance and P-dominance, which are closely related to the one used in this paper. In fact, the extension of the Pareto criterion implicit in our notion of Millian efficiency coincides with their notion of A-dominance, although we incorporate an additional restriction-symmetry-on the set of allocations that can be compared using that criterion. While this restriction seems unnecessary, its absence might significantly reduce the set of allocations that are efficient using the A-dominance criterion.
Another relevant difference between the paper by Golosov et al. and this paper is that, although they are aware of dynamic efficiency problems, in most of their applications they do not face such problems because individual agents are linked intertemporally in such a way that their individual problems can be jointly solved by an infinitely-lived dynastic family.
Michel et al. have also proposed a notion of efficiency, referred to as Pareto optimality, which coincides with our notion of Millian efficiency, although it is not explicitly deduced from an extension of the Pareto criterion as it is in this paper. In addition, both the framework and the scope of their paper are substantially less general, since they restrict their analysis to laissez-faire equilibrium paths-that is, equilibria with no intergenerational transfers-which converge to stationary states.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model. In Section 3, we present the notion of Millian efficiency and provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine whether an allocation is efficient in this sense. In Section 4 we characterize Millian efficient allocations as the equilibria of a decentralized sequential price mechanism. In Section 5, we use the results obtained to provide policy recommendations in different institutional settings. Finally, Section 6 presents the main conclusions of the paper and discusses possible extensions.
THE MODEL: ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Consider an overlapping generations economy with three generations of agents (referred to as old, middle-aged and children) coexisting at each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . In each period t there exist N t−2 ∈ + old adults (who were born at date t − 2), N t−1 ∈ + middle-aged adults (born at date t − 1) and N t ∈ + children (born at t). For each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , write
The number of old adults at t = 0 is normalized to one, and the number of middle-aged adults at t = 0 is given by the initial condition N −1 = n −1 > 0. Resources available can be described as follows. Middle-aged agents are endowed with one unit of time to work, which is supplied inelastically. At each period t = 0, 1, 2 . . ., a perishable consumption good is produced using labour (N t−1 ) and physical capital (K t ) invested in the previous period t − 1 as inputs, that is,
where Y t is total output, and F t : 2 + → is a differentiable, concave function exhibiting constant returns to scale. Physical capital is fully depreciated in the production process, and the stock of capital at period t = 0 is given by the initial condition K 0 = K 0 .
Throughout the paper, we will restrict attention to symmetric allocations in which any two agents of the same generation who get to be alive take the same consumption and investment decisions. The aggregate output of the homogeneous good is used to finance aggregate investments in capital, denoted by K t+1 , to finance aggregate consumption by old adults (denoted by C o t ) and by middle-aged adults (denoted by C m t ), and to cover costs of rearing children. Rearing children is a production activity that takes place within each household and its costs (per middle-aged adult of every family) depend on the state of technology and the number of children raised within the family. More precisely, costs per middle-aged adult of raising n t children at time t are given by b t (n t ), where b t (·) is a differentiable, non-decreasing, and convex function satisfying b t (0) = 0.
At any period, the aggregate resource constraint is
which can be equivalently written as satisfying, for each t = 0, 1, 2 . . . , the resource constraint in (1) and the initial condition
Denote by S the set containing all feasible symmetric allocations. Some final remarks are in order. First, although this specification of utility functions does not cover any form of altruism and hence the results obtained in the paper do not directly apply to many positive models of fertility choice, some of the concepts and problems arising here might be relevant in other settings. Second, note that the utility function u represents the preference orderings of those agents who get to be alive at a given period, and it does not provide any information on whether or not the agents are better off by being alive at a given period rather than by not being born. Finally, notice also that the term n t−1 c
on the left hand side of (2) satisfying the resource constraint in (2) and the initial condition (3) is not a convex set, as it would if the sequence {n t } ∞ t=0 were fixed exogenously.
MILLIAN EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
The most commonly used tool in standard normative economic analysis, the Pareto criterion, is too weak to compare allocations with endogenous fertility choices. The Pareto criterion allows one to rank feasible allocations using the preference orderings of all potential agents on those allocations in which they are alive. However, any two allocations with different population size cannot be ranked, since there is no way to know whether or not an agent who lives in one allocation a but not in another allocation a is better off in the latter than he is in the former. To avoid this problem and to preserve the partial order induced by the Pareto criterion, one needs to extend it to compare allocations with different population size.
A possible extension of the Pareto criterion, applicable to any environment with endogenous fertility, can be constructed by applying the Pareto criterion to rank any two allocations using information from the preference profiles of those agents who are born in the two allocations. This extension has also been suggested by Jones (2004, 2007) , who refer to it as the A-dominance criterion (where A stands for alive agents).
To avoid notational costs and to make the A-dominance criterion suitable to undertake welfare comparisons of symmetric allocations without specifying the identity of every potential agent, we will adopt in what follows the following convention: for every two symmetric allocations a, a ∈ S for which the size of a given generation t is strictly positive (that is, such that N t > 0 and N t > 0), there exists a positive measure of agents born at t in both allocations. With this convention, if we rule out the possibility that the economy collapses at a given date by imposing that N t > 0 must hold for every feasible path, then the restriction of the binary relation induced by the A-dominance criterion to the set S * -formed by all symmetric allocations for which fertility rates are strictly positive-can be stated as follows: an allocation a ∈ S * A-dominates an allocation a ∈ S * if for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . one has U t (a) ≥ U t (a ) and this inequality is strict for some period t.
The A-dominance criterion gives rise to an efficiency criterion, which we refer to as Millian efficiency (or simply, M-efficiency) , to identify the set of maximal elements of the partial order induced by the A-dominance criterion on the set S * . Formally, the notion of Millian efficiency can be defined as follows. Definition 1. A feasible allocation a ∈ S * is said to be Millian efficient if there does not exist another feasible allocation a ∈ S * such that
(ii) there exists at least one period τ such that
Thus, if an allocation is Millian efficient, then there is no way to make all living agents of every generation better off without making some living agents of a generation worse off. Although some other authors have also used this criterion under the name of Pareto optimality, 5 we use a different term to make it clear that it results from restricting a particular extension of the Pareto criterion to the set S * of feasible allocations. 6 Also, although other names (such as, for example, S * -constrained A-efficiency) might be more informative of the normative principles underlying this notion of efficiency, we use the term Millian efficiency because it generalizes a notion of optimality, referred to as Millian optimality, which has been frequently used in the literature. 7 A Millian optimum is an allocation maximizing a Millian social welfare function of the form V λ (a) = ∞ t=−1 λ t−1 U t−1 (a) for a strictly positive sequence of intergenerational weights {λ τ } τ ≥−2 . Clearly, a Millian optimum must be a Millian efficient allocation, but the converse is not in general true; since the set of feasible allocations is unbounded, Millian social welfare functions may not be well defined for many feasible paths, including some that are Millian efficient.
5. See Raut (1992) and, more recently, Michel and Wigniolle (2003) . 6. In Conde-Ruiz et al. (2004, Sec. 5) , we show that if one keeps the symmetry restriction on the set of feasible allocations, then Millian efficient allocations may also be efficient under an alternative extension of the Pareto criterion obtained from a previous assumption on the utility level obtained by non-born agents. That is, using the terminology proposed by Golosov et al., Millian efficient allocations are also S * -constrained P-efficient.
7. See Nerlove, Razin and Sadka (1987) , Cigno (1992 Cigno ( , 2000 or Groezen, Leers and Medjam (2003) .
Although limiting welfare comparisons to allocations exhibiting positive fertility rates seems unnecessarily restrictive, we have shown in Conde-Ruiz et al. (2004, Example 1 ) that without this restriction the A-dominance criterion may induce a non-transitive relation on the set of symmetric allocations. In spite of that, under weak conditions on preferences and technologies (for example, in economies for which F t (K, 0) = 0 for all K ≥ 0), it is possible to show that a symmetric allocation cannot be dominated by an allocation for which N t = 0 from some t on, and therefore a Millian efficient allocation is also efficient in the set of symmetric allocations S.
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With regard to the restriction imposing symmetry, extending the order induced by the A-dominance criterion to asymmetric allocations (that is, to allocations in which two agents with the same preferences and endowments are treated asymmetrically) involves an additional difficulty that appears even when we compare allocations exhibiting positive fertility rates (which guarantees transitivity). To be more precise, a symmetric allocation that is not A-dominated by any other symmetric allocation-i.e., a Millian efficient allocation-might be A-dominated by a non-symmetric allocation.
9 However, to the extent that almost all equilibria analysed in the literature are symmetric equilibria, the notion of Millian efficiency is still relevant since it rules out a wide range of symmetric allocations as being inefficient, even in the absence of a precise criterion to compare asymmetric allocations.
In the following sections, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions characterizing Millian efficient allocations.
Necessary conditions
For every allocation a ∈ S and every t ≥ 0, write e t for the amount of physical resources per middle-aged adult at period t not devoted to feeding the old generation, that is,
With this notation, a necessary condition for Millian efficiency can be stated as follows.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose that a is an M-efficient allocation, and suppose there exists a period τ for which the point ( x τ , k (4) is characterized by the two feasibility constraints
and
together with the first order conditions
Equations (5), (6) and (7) are almost identical to those characterizing Pareto efficient allocations in an exogenous fertility setting (except for the term b t (n t ), which in that setting is assumed to be zero) and are necessary for Pareto efficiency (see e.g., Blanchard et al., 1989, p. 99) . They simply impose feasibility and that marginal rates of substitution between current and future consumption must be equal to marginal return to investments in physical capital. The Millian notion of efficiency imposes an additional condition, represented by equation (8), stating that if marginal willingness to pay for children (given by u 3 ( x t )/u 1 ( x t )) is not equal to marginal costs of rearing children, then the marginal rate of return to investments in children must be equal to the rate of return to any other investment, that is,
Conditions (7) and (8), which together with feasibility constitute necessary conditions for (interior) Millian efficiency, also appear in other papers providing normative principles to evaluate fertility decisions. For example, Eckstein and Wolpin (1985) explore the properties of the golden rule allocation, i.e., the allocation maximizing the utility obtained by a representative agent in a stationary state, and therefore impose two additional conditions: stationarity (i.e., a t = a t+1 for all t) and the additional condition
= n t . Also, Groezen, Leers and Medjam (2003) explore the properties of the allocations maximizing a Millian social welfare function for which λ t = δ t for every t, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter representing a social discount factor, and therefore impose that δ
= n t must be satisfied. Thus, both Eckstein et al. and Groezen et al. select a subset of all possible allocations satisfying the necessary conditions for Millian efficiency. In addition, these articles do not take into account the fact that the feasible set in the welfare optimization problems explored by these authors is non-convex, and therefore an allocation satisfying these first order conditions might not correspond to the golden rule allocation or to a Millian optimum. Balasko and Shell (1980) have argued that determining a set of conditions that are necessary for achieving efficiency in an overlapping generations setting is fairly simple: every efficient allocation must also be statically (or short-run) efficient, i.e., it cannot be improved upon by a reallocation of resources of a finite number of generations. When applied to the Millian notion of efficiency, this weak notion of efficiency can be defined as follows.
Definition 2. A feasible allocation a ∈ S * is said to be statically (or short-run) Millian efficient if there does not exist another feasible allocation a ∈ S * and T ≥ 0 such that
Below, we show that a feasible allocation satisfying the necessary conditions in (7)- (8) is statically Millian efficient. First, observe that W t−1 ( e t , e t+1 ) is the maximum utility that an individual born at t − 1, endowed with e t units of physical resources, can obtain if she is constrained to provide e t+1 units of resources to each of her children. Notice also that by strict monotonicity of preferences, each function W t−1 must be strictly increasing in e t and strictly decreasing in e t+1 . By Proposition 1, the question of whether an allocation a satisfying the necessary conditions in (4) is efficient or not can be reduced to an issue of whether or not there exists a sequence { e t } ∞ t=0 such that W t−1 ( e t , e t+1 ) ≥ W t−1 ( e t , e t+1 ) for all t ≥ 0, and
With this observation in mind, it is straightforward to show that an allocation satisfying the necessary condition in Proposition 1 cannot be improved upon by a reallocation of resources involving a finite number of generations and, therefore, it is statically efficient. More precisely, an allocation satisfying the necessary conditions can only be dominated by an allocation that reduces the endowment available to every generation, i.e., by a reallocation of resources involving an infinite sequence of intergenerational transfers from every generation to the previous generation. This is stated formally in the following Lemma, closely related to a result by Balasko and Shell (1980, Lemma 5.4 ).
Lemma 1. (i) Let a ∈ S * be an allocation satisfying the necessary conditions in Proposition 1, and suppose there exists an allocation a ∈ S
* that Millian dominates the allocation a. Then, there exists some period T ≥ 0, such that, e t ≤ e t for all t ≥ 0, and e τ < e τ for all τ ≥ T .
(9)
(ii) Let a ∈ S * be an allocation satisfying the necessary conditions in Proposition 1. Then a is statically Millian efficient.
Proof. To prove (i), let a ∈ S * be an inefficient allocation satisfying the conditions (5)- (8), and let a be an allocation that Millian dominates the allocation a, that is, an allocation satisfying W t−1 ( e t , e t+1 ) ≥ W t−1 ( e t , e t+1 ) and W T −1 ( e T , e T +1 ) > W T −1 ( e T , e T +1 ) for some t = T .
To show that a satisfies condition (9), observe first that a verifies e 0 ≤ e 0 , where the inequality must be strict if U −2 ( a) > U −2 ( a). Taking into account that W −1 (·) is strictly increasing in e 0 one obtains
Also, since W −1 (·) is strictly decreasing in e 1 , the inequality W −1 ( e 0 , e 1 ) ≥ W −1 ( e 0 , e 1 ) is only satisfied if e 1 ≤ e 1 , where the last inequality must be strict if either W −1 ( e 0 , e 1 ) > W −1 ( e 0 , e 1 ) or e 0 < e 0 is satisfied. Proceeding analogously, since W 0 (·) is strictly decreasing in e 2 and the inequality W 0 ( e 1 , e 2 ) ≥ W 0 ( e 1 , e 2 ) must be satisfied, one must have e 2 ≤ e 2 (with e 2 < e 2 if either W 0 ( e 1 , e 2 ) > W 0 ( e 1 , e 2 ) or e 1 < e 1 holds). By applying the argument recursively one obtains e t − e t ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0 and e τ − e τ > 0 for some T and all τ ≥ T , which establishes condition (9) and, therefore, it establishes (i).
To prove (ii), note from (i) that an allocation a satisfying conditions (ii) and (iii) in the definition of static efficiency must violate condition (i). Thus, a is statically Millian efficient, which completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Thus, in spite of non-convexities, an allocation that satisfies the first order conditions (5)- (8) is statically efficient. This occurs because non-convexities arising in endogenous fertility settings are of very special type: although the set of feasible allocations forms a nonconvex set, all the feasibility constraints in the sequence of optimization problems associated to the notion of static efficiency do form convex sets for each fixed pair (e t , e t+1 ). (This would not occur, for instance, if the functions F t were not concave, as in models with increasing returns to scale.) As we will see in the next section, non-convexities become relevant when we explore how to improve a given allocation through a sequence of transfers that reduce the amount of resources e t available to each agent of generation t.
Sufficient conditions
In the previous subsection we have obtained necessary conditions for Millian efficiency, but those conditions do not guarantee that an allocation solving the sequence of optimization problems in the statement of Proposition 1 is actually M-efficient. Well-known theoretical work deals with the issue of efficiency in dynamic models, such as Cass (1972) in the context of a simple physical capital growth model, and Balasko and Shell (1980) who focus on an overlapping generations exchange economy. These papers show that, while an allocation can be statically efficient, it might not be dynamically efficient, that is, fully efficient. In this subsection, we extend these previous results to an environment of endogenous population.
Recall In an exogenous population setting, the ratio R t+1 ( e t , e t+1 )/n t ( e t , e t+1 ) is crucial to determine whether or not an allocation is dynamically efficient. As we will show below, things are slightly different when the rate of population growth is endogenous.
3.2.1. Intuition: the case of stationary allocations. We first provide some intuitions by considering economies without growth for which the indirect utility function and the function determining the slope of the indifference curve passing through any point are the same for all generations, that is, W t−1 ≡ W and m t−1 ≡ m for all t ≥ 0. We explore whether a stationary allocation a, such that a t = a t+1 = a for all t ≥ 0, can be dominated, or not, by other stationary allocations. Since for any stationary allocation one has e t = e t+1 = e for all t ≥ 0, the set of stationary allocations is represented by the line e t = e t+1 in 2 + . Recall from the previous section that an allocation a satisfying the necessary conditions can only be dominated by an allocation a involving a infinite sequence of positive intergenerational transfers {∇e t } t≥0 from every generation to the previous generation, where ∇e t = e t − e t . For our stationary setting, this reduces to a constant transfer ∇e = e − e ≥ 0.
To simplify things, assume first that W is strictly quasiconcave, that is, the slope of any indifference curve passing through a pair (e t , e t+1 )-which is given by R(e t , e t+1 )/n(e t , e t+1 )-decreases as e t increases. In this case, if an agent transfers ∇e t units of resources to the previous generation-therefore reducing her endowment in ∇e t units-such agent will be worse off unless she is compensated by receiving an amount of resources ∇e t+1 n(e t , e t+1 ) satisfying ∇e t+1 n(e t , e t+1 ) ≥ ∇e t R(e t , e t+1 ). Consider now a point like (e , e ) in Figure 1 , corresponding to a stationary allocation a satisfying the necessary conditions (5)- (8), with e t = e t+1 = e . Note that for such allocation one has R(e , e )/n(e , e ) < 1. Clearly, a is not efficient since by reducing e towards point e g in the figure, all agents are better off. By contrast, consider now a point like (e , e ), corresponding to an allocation a for which e t = e t+1 = e and R(e , e )/n(e , e ) > 1. Apparently, it is possible to improve all agents by increasing e in the direction of e g . However, achieving welfare improvements by increasing e is impossible, because increasing e from period t = τ on implies that agents born at time t = τ − 2 (i.e., the old generation at period τ ) necessarily decrease their consumption and, hence, their utility. Thus, such an allocation a cannot be dominated by any other stationary allocation.
To summarize, it is straightforward to prove that if W is quasiconcave, then a necessary and sufficient condition ensuring that a stationary allocation a such that e t = e t+1 = e is not dominated by any other stationary allocation is
R( e, e) ≥ n( e, e).
In what follows, we will refer to this condition as the weak version of the Phelps-KoopmansDiamond (PKD) condition (see Galor and Ryder, 1991) , to distinguish it from the strong version of the PKD condition for which the above inequality is strict. R(e, e)/n(e, e) ≥ 1 no longer guarantees that a is not dominated by any other stationary allocation. This case is illustrated in Figure 2 , in which a point (e, e) corresponding to an allocation satisfying condition PKD corresponds to an inefficient allocation. Note that any allocation a such that e 1 < e < e 2 dominates the allocation a. Observe that the line with slope R(e, e)/n(e, e) passing through (e, e) does not separate the upper contour set of this point.
The intuition of why the indirect utility function might not be quasiconcave and condition PKD may fail to identify undominated paths is the following. Observe first that R(e, e) is the marginal rate of return to investments in physical capital and therefore it measures the marginal loss (in terms of future consumption) which an agent incurs when he transfers resources to the previous generation, while n(e, e) measures marginal benefits received by the same agent if all members of the following generation do the same. In an exogenous fertility setting, n is fixed and marginal productivity of capital increases as intergenerational transfers are higher, since investments in physical capital must be reduced to finance these transfers. Therefore, the marginal analysis implicit in condition PKD is enough to establish that, starting from a stationary allocation such that R(e, e) > n(e, e), any additional increase of intergenerational transfers to the old adults decreases welfare.
When fertility is endogenous, the ratio of marginal benefits to marginal costs of transfers to the old adults might raise its value as the amount of these transfers is higher. This occurs because the rate of return to investments in children goes up as intergenerational transfers increase; therefore, from the point of view of static efficiency, a higher rate of return to children should be accompanied by a higher population growth. Thus, even if one starts from an allocation in which R(e, e)/n(e, e) > 1, so that marginal costs of increasing intergenerational transfers exceed marginal benefits, the ratio R(e , e )/n(e , e ) may turn out to be smaller than one as we move away from the margin and increase transfers to the old generation by a sufficiently high amount. Proof. The proof is straightforward from the definition of π and Lemma 1.(i).
3.2.2.
A sufficient condition for dynamic efficiency: the general case. In the previous section, we have provided a complete characterization of all stationary allocations that are not dominated by any other stationary allocation. Although non-convexities arising in our model make it difficult to extend these results to obtain a complete characterization of dynamically efficient paths (as those obtained by Cass, 1972, and Balasko and Shell, 1980 , with exogenous fertility), the following proposition provides a sufficient condition that guarantees that a-not necessarily stationary-allocation is efficient even if the indirect utility function W t−1 is not quasiconcave. 
then a is Millian efficient.
Proof. Consider an allocation a ∈ S satisfying conditions (5)- (8), and (10), and suppose now that it is not efficient. To show that this yields a contradiction, let a be an allocation dominating the allocation a, and let τ be the first period for which W τ −1 ( e τ , e τ +1 ) > W τ −1 ( e τ , e τ +1 ).
Observe that by Lemma 1(i), e τ < e τ must be satisfied, and therefore there exists τ such that τ = e τ − e τ > 0. Since a satisfies condition (10), there must exist an infinite subsequence , which, for T ∈ T contradicts condition (11) and, therefore, establishes that a is Millian efficient.
A straightforward corollary refers to the sufficient condition that guarantees that an allocation converging to a stationary allocation is efficient. Remarks. With Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 in mind, we can provide an almost complete characterization of any dynamically efficient allocation a such that lim t→∞ e t = e. If π ( e, e) < 1 then proceed as in Proposition 2 to show that a is dominated by an allocation that becomes stationary from some t on, and hence it is dynamically inefficient; if π ( e, e) > 1, then a is dynamically efficient by Corollary 1 to Proposition 3. Finally, note that for the particular case for which π ( e, e) = 1, dynamic efficiency is not guaranteed even though a is not dominated by any other stationary allocation.
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As we will see in Examples 1 to 3 below, computing π t ( e t , e t+1 ) might be difficult because it requires computing the indirect utility function at every (e t , e t+1 ) << ( e t , e t+1 ).
The following Lemma provides a simpler sufficient condition guaranteeing that π ( e, e) > 1 is satisfied.
Lemma 2. Consider a statically Millian efficient allocation a ∈ S
* , for which lim t→∞ e t = e. If
R(e, e)/n(e, e) > 1 for all
10. We should note here that a similar result holds in an exogenous fertility setting, in which an allocation converging to a steady state such that R/n = 1 might be dynamically inefficient (e.g., Cass, 1972, Sec. IV) .
then π( e, e) > 1 is satisfied and, by Corollary 1, a is Millian efficient.
Proof. To prove Lemma 2, consider a stationary allocation a verifying (10) and suppose π ( e, e) < 1 is satisfied. Since R( e, e) > n( e, e) is satisfied and W is continuously differentiable, the fact that π ( e, e) < 1 is satisfied implies that the indifference curve defined by W (e, e) = W ( e, e) crosses (from below) the line e t = e t+1 at some point ( e, e); that is, there must exist e < e such that W ( e, e) = W ( e, e) and R( e, e) < n( e, e), a contradiction that proves the Lemma.
Observe that, for economies verifying that the function z : −→ defined by z(e) = R(e, e)/n(e, e) is decreasingly monotonic, condition (12) reduces to the weak PKD condition R( e, e)/n( e, e) ≥ 1.
Some examples.
To conclude the section, we illustrate our results by exploring the dynamic efficiency of stationary allocations in several economies with time-invariant preferences and technologies. As we will see in Section 4, many equilibria arising in these types of economies converge to stationary allocations, and thus the analysis developed here can be used to evaluate the performance of such equilibria. We show that even if the indirect utility functions and the function π are difficult to compute, it is possible to apply Proposition 3 to show that in some cases the strong version of the PKD criterion correctly identifies dynamically efficient paths, while in others it may not. The examples suggest that non-convexities that originate a failure in the PKD criterion might be related to the degree of substitutability between factors. 
0) = 0, the function z must also be decreasing in e and it satisfies z(0) > 0. In this case, the strong PKD condition R( e, e)/n( e, e) > 1 correctly identifies efficient allocations, since for every e such that R( e, e)/n( e, e) > 1 one must have R(e, e)/n(e, e) > 1 for every e < e, which by Lemma 2 yields π( e, e) > 1. 
In this case, and for sufficiently high values of ρ, H is not increasingly monotonic, and therefore equation R(e, e)/n(e, e) = 1 might have two positive solutions. For the particular case in which δ = 1/3, γ = 1/3, A = 1, B = 3, ρ = 1/2, and β = 1 equation R(e, e)/n(e, e) = 1 can be written as
and has two positive roots at e = 12 and e = 18.75, which correspond to k m (e) = 1 and k m (e) = 4 respectively. We show in Figure 3 that the PKD criterion might fail to identify efficient allocations. Figure 3 (a) displays the value of the ratio R(e, e)/n(e, e) for each stationary allocation, and indicates those stationary allocations e ∈ [0, 12] [18.75, +∞) that fulfil the PKD criterion, i.e., R(e, e)/n(e, e) ≥ 1. Figure 3(b) represents the utility obtained by a representative agent at each stationary allocation, W (e, e), and shows that not all of these stationary allocations are efficient. Figure 3 (b) also shows that there exists no interior allocation maximizing the utility obtained by a representative agent in a steady state (that is, the "golden rule" R/n = 1 identifies either a local maximum or a local minimum of that maximization problem, but not a global maximum). Since W achieves a local maximum at e = 12 and there exists a stationary amount of resources e * = 24.84 such that W (e, e) = W (e * , e * ), it is easy to observe that any statically efficient allocation such that e ∈ [0, 12) (24.84, +∞) is dynamically efficient, while the allocations that fall into the region e ∈ (12, 24.84) are dynamically inefficient. Within this region those allocations in the interval [18.75, 24 .84) verify the PKD condition, but they are not dynamically efficient. To conclude the example, suppose that we restrict fertility decisions are exogenously determined by n t = n t and costs of rearing children are zero (i.e., β t = 0). In this case, capital with (n t ) being a constant dependent on the parameters, which now include fertility rates.
A closer look at the three examples together suggests that the degree of substitutability between factors may play a role in generating non-convexities in the indirect utility function. For technologies exhibiting a higher degree of substitutability, as those in Example 2 and 3, a reduction in current consumption and physical capital investments, accompanied by an increase in the number of children-i.e, of future workers-and in intergenerational transfers to the old adults, may have smaller effects on marginal productivity of physical capital.
A CHARACTERIZATION OF M-EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS AS DECENTRALIZED EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we provide an alternative characterization of interior statically efficient allocations as the equilibria of a decentralized price mechanism with-government mandated-intergenerational transfers. This price mechanism is described as follows. There are two markets operating at each date t ≥ 0: a financial market, which allows agents to lend (or borrow) an arbitrary amount s t of the homogeneous good in period t, and obtain (or pay back) a return equal to R t+1 units of the same good in period t + 1; and a spot job market, in which labour is exchanged against the homogeneous good at a price w t . In addition, suppose the government enforces an intergenerational transfer programme, 11 represented by a sequence τ = {τ t } t≥0 , that collects (gives) a lump-sum tax (subsidy) τ t from every middle-aged adult living at t, and gives (collects) every old adult a transfer (fee) ρ t that depends linearly on the number of children that she has, according to the rule ρ t = P (n t−1 ) = n t−1 τ t . Notice that such an intergenerational policy is balanced in every period.
With these two markets operating at each date, given the equilibrium prices (R * t+1 , w * t ) and the pair of intergenerational transfers τ t and τ t+1 , an agent born at period t − 1 will select her consumption bundle x * t and savings s * t by solving her life-cycle optimization problem at period t 
11. Since the agents are non-altruistic towards their descendants, it is assumed that the intergenerational transfers described by τ are imposed by the government. Although some authors (e.g., Cigno, 1993) have suggested that the agents may sustain positive transfers from the middle-aged to the old adults as a subgame perfect equilibrium of a voluntary contribution game played within the families, this possibility will not be considered here.
together with the two feasibility constraints in the definition of V t−1 (w * t − τ t , R *
t+1 , τ t+1 ).
On the other hand, firms will select labour (L * t ) and physical capital (K * t ) to maximize profits,
which yields the first order conditions w *
) ) and
), one has
For the initial condition n −2 , n −1 , k o 0 = 1, n −1 , K 0 , and a given sequence of intergenerational transfers τ = {τ t } ∞ t=0 , an interior decentralized equilibrium (generated by τ ) is an interior allocation a * and a sequence of prices (w
satisfying (14)- (18) and the two individual budget constraints in (13) for all t ≥ 0. These equations provide a straightforward characterization of statically M-efficient interior allocations as the equilibria of the sequential price mechanism described above, as the following result states. (5), (7) and (8) for each t ≥ 0. Then, in order to show that a * also satisfies (6), we make use of the budget constraint for the old adult agent in (13), condition (18), and the fact that at competitive equilibrium prices maximum profits are equal to zero at all periods.
Theorem 4. (i) Consider an arbitrary sequence
To prove (ii), let a * be an interior statically M-efficient allocation satisfying the necessary conditions (5)-(8). Then, it is straightforward to check that a sequence of intergenerational transfers {τ t+1 } ∞ t=−1 defined by (15) generates a * as an interior decentralized equilibrium allocation.
Thus, the notion of static Millian efficiency admits a characterization that is closely analogous to the one provided by the two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics. Nevertheless, several observations are in order. With respect to the statement (i) in Theorem 4, which can be regarded as a version of the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem, it generalizes the results obtained by Eckstein et al. (1995) , who study how to decentralize the golden rule allocation and therefore impose that the (constant) system of intergenerational transfers τ is selected in such a way that R t /n t = 1 is satisfied. Also, Groezen, et al. (2003) , have explored how to decentralize the maximum of a Millian welfare function (with a constant social discount factor δ) in a small open economy with Cobb-Douglas preferences, and therefore impose that R t /n t = δ is satisfied.
12 Thus, our formulation makes it clear that a policy-maker who wishes to achieve Millian efficiency (in a static sense) does not need any particular information on preferences, technologies or future prices.
13 A particularly interesting equilibria for which (i) applies is the laissez-faire, complete market equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium for which τ t = 0 for every t. Thus, in the absence of any intervention and with a complete set of markets opening at each date, prices give agents all the information needed to implement (static) Millian efficiency.
The statement (ii) of Theorem 4 can be regarded as a version of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. Similar to the case of economies with exogenous population, every Millian efficient allocation can be decentralized by initially selecting an appropriate sequence of intergenerational transfers and by then allowing the agents to determine their consumption and investment decisions in competitive markets. Different from the standard, exogenous population case, in which non-distorting intergenerational transfers must be lumpsum for all agents, an incentive scheme that links intergenerational transfers with fertility decisions is needed. More precisely, for every system of intergenerational transfers that achieves Millian efficiency, every middle-aged adult has to pay a tax τ t ≥ 0 (or, for the case in which τ t < 0, receive a lump-sum subsidy), while every old adult has to receive a subsidy (or pay a tax) which depends linearly on the number of children she decides to have.
To summarize, in the absence of any intervention, fertility choices involve no pure externalities. It is only the enforcement of intergenerational transfers by an external authority which introduces externalities that needs to be internalized with an incentive scheme. For example, when a government imposes transfers to the old adults, children become an investment good because individuals receive transfers from members of the younger generation when they reach their mature age. If these transfers do not depend on fertility choices, then children become a public investment good. This issue takes on special relevance whenever the laissezfaire equilibrium is dynamically inefficient, as we will see in Section 5.
Dynamic efficiency and competitive prices
The characterization given above refers to statically M-efficient allocations. Of course, many of the equilibria generated by a sequence of intergenerational transfers might be dynamically inefficient, and therefore it is worth exploring which of these equilibria ensure that dynamic efficiency is achieved.
One way to proceed consists of computing the sequence π t (e * t , e * t+1 ) t≥0 associated to an equilibrium path and then applying Proposition 3. In order to explore the properties of the sequence e * t t≥0
, recall that for any decentralized equilibrium one must have e * t = w * t − τ t , for t ≥ 0. Let {(w * t , R * t+1 )} t≥0 be a path of competitive equilibrium prices induced by a given intergenerational transfer scheme {τ t+1 } t≥−1 , which can be respectively written as R * t+1 = R t+1 (e * t , τ t+1 ) and w * t+1 = w t+1 (e * t , τ t+1 ). Under weak assumptions on production and utility functions, it can be shown that for every e t ≥ 0, both R t+1 (e * t , ·) and w t+1 (e * t , ·) 12. We should mention that the two papers cited above do not take into account the problems originated by non-convexities, and take for granted that first order conditions associated to the welfare maximization problems characterize a maximum, which might be incorrect. In fact, the parametric small open economy studied by Groezen et al. is essentially equivalent to the economy with linear technology and exogenous wages and interest rates that we study in our Example 3 above, which yields indirect utility functions that are not quasiconcave.
13. The papers mentioned above explore the efficiency properties of a decentralized equilibrium induced by a standard PAYG social security system and a system of child allowances financed by a lump-sum tax levied on the middle-aged generation, which yields a (statically) Millian efficient allocation only if child allowances received by parents equal the present value of a child's contribution to social security paid at t + 1. are well defined functions on + . The sequence e * t t≥0
corresponding to the equilibrium generated by a sequence {τ t } t≥0 is therefore determined by a difference equation of the form e * t+1 = w t+1 e * t , τ t+1 − τ t+1 , with the initial condition e * 0 = D 2 F (K 0 , n −1 ) − τ 0 . Thus, one way to study the dynamic efficiency properties of the equilibrium generated by τ consists of exploring the properties of the solution to such a differential equation. A case of interest is the one where this solution converges to a stationary path e * (or to a balanced growth path e * t t≥0
), as we can apply previous results and check whether or not π(e * , e * ) > 1 (or lim t−→∞ π t (e * t , θe * t ) > θ) is satisfied. In specific time-invariant economies with homothetic preferences and linear costs, such as those studied in Examples 1 to 3, the procedure described above involves no computational difficulties, since in this case the allocation generated by a constant system of intergenerational transfers τ such that τ t = τ for all t ≥ 0 is the stationary allocation a * satisfying e * t = w t (1, τ ) − τ for all t. Thus, the analysis developed in Examples 1 to 3 can be easily extended to explore the efficiency properties of equilibria in these economies. These examples show that a given path of intergenerational transfers τ yields different dynamic efficiency properties depending on the parameters characterizing technologies and preferences rather than on the specific pattern of intergenerational transfers.
In less specific models, computing each π t (e * t , e * t+1 ) may involve some difficulties, for it requires computing W t−1 (e t , e t+1 ) for every pair (e t , e t+1 ) ≤ (e * t , e * t+1 ). Proposition 5 below provides simpler conditions for dynamic efficiency of decentralized equilibria.
Proposition 5. Consider an interior decentralized equilibrium (a
then a * is Millian efficient.
Proof. See the appendix.
For economies with time-invariant technologies, the following corollary holds:
Corollary 2. Consider an economy such that production and cost functions are time invariant (i.e. F t (·) ≡ F (·) and b t (·) ≡ b(·) for all t), and let
Proof. It follows directly from Proposition 5.
Consequently, the strong PKD criterion should be replaced by this alternative criterion, which states that the rate of return to physical capital should be higher than a term that corresponds to the (highest) rate of return to investments in children (if we abstract from direct utility gains that children bring with them), i.e., w * /b (0). Condition (19) in Proposition 5 might also be useful to evaluate the dynamic efficiency of non-stationary allocations. For instance, consider an economy in which (linear) costs of rearing children grow at the same rate as total factor productivity, i.e., F t (K t , L t ) = θ t F (K t , L t ) and b(n t ) = β t n t = β 0 θ t n t . If preferences are homothetic, then a laissez-faire equilibrium of such an economy converges to a balanced growth path (a * , (w * , R * )) such that w * t+1 = e * t+1 = θ e * t = θw * t = θβ * t and R t = R * . For such a balanced growth path, the condition in Proposition 5 can be simplified as β 0 R * > θ.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Two questions have motivated our work: whether or not the growth rate of population is too high or too low and, whether or not there exist policies affecting fertility rates that implement a welfare improvement. Our results show that such issues should not be taken in isolation from intergenerational distribution considerations. Taking the laissez-faire equilibrium as the status quo, the enforcement of a policy that transfers resources from the middle-aged generation to the old one should be accompanied by an incentive scheme that makes these transfers depend on fertility decisions, and may be justified when future generations benefit enough from technical progress. Symmetrically, if policy makers decide to control birth rates (maybe because the standard of living of future generations is judged to be too low), then the Millian efficient way to achieve birth control is by taxing fertility choices and using the revenue to provide resources to the young, which both reduces birth rates and raises the standard of living of future generations. In this section, we discuss in more detail how fertility and intergenerational policies interact in various institutional settings in which market equilibria are inefficient. We focus on two policies, social security and public education, and distinguish between two sources of market failure: dynamic inefficiencies (Section 5.1) and financial market incompleteness (Section 5.2). We are interested in the latter because it occurs in economies with human capital. These two sources of market failures have already been explored in frameworks with exogenous fertility, but policies that are optimal there are not optimal here and vice versa. Thus, a standard pay-as-you-go social security system, which eliminates dynamic inefficiencies when fertility is exogenous, becomes an inadequate policy instrument in our setting unless pensions are explicitly linked with fertility decisions. Also, when social security and public education are used, restoring efficiency in our setting requires taking into account fertility decisions. The latter, in particular, extends in a policy relevant from the results obtained in Boldrin and Montes (2005) for the case of constant population.
Dynamic inefficiencies, fertility and public pensions
Consider a laissez-faire equilibrium that is statically efficient but dynamically inefficient. Which policy instruments should we recommend? A welfare improving policy corresponds to an intergenerational transfer, which, in view of Lemma 1, must also induce a reduction of the income level arising in the laissez-faire equilibrium. Moreover, for the first period in which the new intergenerational policy is implemented, transfers received by those in their old age cannot be negative, since otherwise these agents would be worse off than they were in the laissezfaire equilibrium. If, for example, we restrict the analysis to stationary economies and the new policy is constant (i.e., it satisfies τ t = τ t+1 = τ ), then it must collect (positive) contributions from middle-aged agents to provide old adults with more resources. The same holds even if we allow for non-constant policies, provided each function w t+1 (·) is non-decreasing in e t and non-increasing in τ t+1 , as occurs with homothetic preferences.
Thus, dynamic inefficiencies are eliminated by a policy that collects (positive) contributions from the middle-aged to provide old adults with higher resources, in an amount that depends on their past fertility decisions. Such a policy can be regarded as a fertility-related pay-asyou-go social security programme (called, hereafter, an F-PAYG programme), and defined as P t (n t−1 ) = n t−1 τ t . Since an F-PAYG programme induces higher fertility rates, dynamic inefficiencies are associated to too low fertility rates.
When fertility decisions are exogenous, it is well known, from Diamond (1965) and Aaron (1966) , that a system of intergenerational transfers which is independent of fertility decisions improves the welfare of every individual if the economy is dynamically inefficient. The budget constraints faced by an individual with a standard pay-as-you-go social security system (τ t , ρ t+1 ) (hereafter an S-PAYG) are therefore given by
Notice that with an S-PAYG, individuals face a budget constraint that is analogous to the one arising with an F-PAYG, but with a crucial difference: in an S-PAYG, middle-aged agents do not internalize the impact of their fertility decisions on the pension they will receive. Conditions characterizing equilibrium behaviour arising with an S-PAYG are therefore different from those arising with an F-PAYG, which in view of Theorem 4 implies that an S-PAYG induces an inefficient allocation (both statically and dynamically). To be more precise, in the equilibrium generated by an S-PAYG, the rate of return to investments in physical capital is lower than the (social) rate of return to investments in children and therefore, such an equilibrium exhibits too low population growth rates.
We should also note that the allocation induced by an S-PAYG might dominate (in the Millian sense) the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation, which by Theorem 4 is statically efficient. However, when the laissez-faire equilibrium converges to a stationary allocation a * , it is possible to show that this possibility arises if and only if n * > R * is satisfied. As mentioned above, an important difference distinguishing our setting from one with exogenous fertility is that, in the former, the ratio of marginal benefits to marginal costs of increasing intergenerational transfers to the old adults-i.e., of increasing contributions to social security-might be higher as these transfers are higher. This occurs because, for a properly designed social security system such as an F-PAYG, an increase in intergenerational transfers to old adults-i.e., an increase in the size of contributions to social security-raises the value of children as investment goods. With an S-PAYG, however, increasing contributions to social security does not make children more valuable, and therefore an S-PAYG will bring with it net welfare gains only if the standard marginal condition n * > R * is satisfied. Our results are relevant for the current debate over the reform of unfunded social security systems threatened by aging populations. With exogenous fertility, if the economy is dynamically efficient, it is impossible to reform an S-PAYG in a Pareto improving way (see Diamond, 1965; Gale, 1973) . With endogenous fertility, it might be welfare improving a social security reform that progressively reduces pensions (and public debt) and makes these lower pensions fertility dependent.
Fertility, social security and public education
In the previous subsection, we have explored the consequences of introducing social security in an economy with complete markets. The literature has provided other normative justifications 14. This formulation of a PAYG admits, as particular cases, frameworks studied by Diamond (1965) and Aaron (1966) . Diamond focuses on the role of debt to achieve Pareto improvements with respect to the laissez-faire equilibrium and, therefore, explores a programme in which all contributions and pensions (except those made at time t = 0) are zero; Aaron restricts attention to balanced programmes.
for the introduction of a PAYG social security system. For example, Boldrin and Montes (2005) have shown that, in a world without credit markets to finance the accumulation of human capital, a social security and a publicly financed education programme can be designed in such a way that they induce an equilibrium replicating the complete market equilibrium allocation. This not only restores efficiency, but also brings with it net welfare gains.
In this subsection, we extend their set-up to the case of endogenous fertility. The homogeneous consumption good is produced using not only physical capital, but also using human capital provided by the middle-aged, h m t , as inputs, with a constant returns to scale neoclassical production function Y t = F (K t 
By proceeding as in Proposition 1, every statically Millian efficient allocation a can be characterized as an allocation satisfying u( x t ) = W t−1 ( e t , e t+1 ), where e t is now defined by
Thus, an allocation a satisfying the feasibility condition above is statically Millian efficient if it also satisfies, for each t, the first order conditions
Therefore, in addition to conditions guaranteeing optimal allocation of consumption, physical capital and fertility choices, static efficiency imposes that the rate of return to human capital investment, measured by
, equals the return to any other investment, as established in (22).
Proceeding as in the proofs of Theorem 4, it is possible to show that every statically Millian efficient allocation can be also characterized as the equilibrium induced by a policy enforcing a sequence of transfers τ , and a complete set of labour and capital markets. In the former market, effective labour, or human capital, is purchased against the consumption good at a unit price ω t , while in the latter market firms and children borrow from middle-aged agents at a real interest rate R t to finance their investments in physical and human capital. Thus, at equilibrium prices (R * t , ω * t , R * t+1 ), the maximization problem faced by an individual born at t − 1 is now given by 
and 
Thus, with free access to capital and labour markets, an equilibrium (a * , (ω * , R * )) generated by a sequence of transfers τ (hereafter, a complete market equilibrium generated by τ ) is characterized by the system of equations given by the utility maximizing conditions in (24), the income maximizing condition (25), the profit maximizing conditions in (26) 
Note that equations (24)- (26) guarantee an optimal accumulation of human capital, represented by (23). Also, proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 4, it can also be shown that all other static efficiency conditions in (21) to (23) are also satisfied. As a particular case, the laissez-faire, complete market equilibrium for which τ ≡ 0 is, therefore, statically Millian efficient. Finally, it can also be shown that a condition analogous to the one in Proposition 3 is sufficient to guarantee that an equilibrium satisfying this condition is dynamically efficient.
Although, with complete markets, extending Theorem 4 to economies with human capital is straightforward, credit markets financing educational investments are rare 15 because children cannot sign binding contracts by which they could commit to repaying credits when middle aged. 16 Lack of borrowing opportunities to invest in human capital for the younger generation implies d m * t−1 = 0 for all t, and h m * t+1 = h(0, h y t ). The resulting equilibrium, which we refer to as an equilibrium with incomplete markets, is therefore described by a system analogous to that describing a complete market equilibrium, but which differs from a complete market equilibrium in that equation (25) is substituted by d m * t−1 = 0. It is straightforward to see that an equilibrium with incomplete markets is inefficient, both statically and dynamically.
In analogy with Boldrin and Montes (2005) , a combination of public education and a PAYG social security system may restore efficiency. To see this, consider an intergenerational policy by which, in each period t, two lump-sum taxes, τ P t and τ E t , are levied on the middleaged generation to finance pensions for the old and education for the children. Thus, it is the government who decides the amount of resources d m * t invested in the education of each young agent born at t. To make sure that pensions provide the middle-aged with the right 15. See Becker (1975) for a classical discussion and Kehoe and Levine (2001) for a more recent one. 16. As with the notion of decentralized equilibrium with transfers, the possibility that parents finance their children's education as the equilibrium outcome of a dynamic game will not be considered here.
incentives to undertake their fertility decisions, we consider a fertility-related pension scheme P t+1 (n t ) = ϕ t+1 + ρ t+1 n t . At equilibrium prices, the budget constraints for a representative member of the generation born in period t − 1 are now
Thus, an individual's optimal decision (x * t , s * t ) must satisfy, together with these constraints, the first order conditions
Assume period-by-period budget balance, that is,
Taking into account firms' behaviour and market clearing conditions (now given by H (21)- (23), it is straightforward to prove that the equilibrium a * generated by a welfare state programme (τ E , τ P , ϕ, ρ) is Millian efficient if, and only if, the policy satisfies
By varying each term ρ t (linking pensions with fertility decisions), the class of intergenerational policies analysed here spans the whole set of complete market, decentralized equilibria and, hence, the whole set of (statically) M-efficient allocations. To be more precise, the allocation induced by an intergenerational welfare state (τ E , τ P , ϕ, ρ) satisfying conditions (32) and (33) coincides with the complete market equilibrium generated by a sequence τ such that τ t = ρ t for every t. 17. As we have pointed out in Section 4, there might be equivalent ways to achieve efficiency. For example, a welfare state for which public education is financed by a-fertility dependent-tax on middle-aged agents, and pensions are linearly dependent on the number of descendants, may also yield efficient outcomes. As a particular case, a welfare state with only public education (and no pensions) could also be efficient, although only if the tax to finance education depends on fertility decisions. Thus, when financial markets are incomplete and taxes financing public education are lumpsum, at least part of the pension payment received by individuals must be independent of their past fertility decisions and should equal the capitalized value of previous (public) investments in education. The optimal social security scheme developed here differs from the one arising in a setting with complete markets, for which future pensions are related only to the number of descendants. To obtain an intuition of why this occurs, recall that, with complete markets, a fertility dependent social security is the adequate instrument to undertake intergenerational transfers that would not arise through competitive markets. However, with incomplete markets, a joint programme encompassing social security and public education is also an instrument to undertake intergenerational transfers that would arise with complete markets but do not if financial markets are incomplete. As we have argued in the discussion of Theorem 4, prices give the agents enough information to undertake efficient investments, and they need not know the number of individuals in the next generation when taking these decisions.
Conditions (32) and (33) are analogous to the ones provided by Boldrin and Montes (2005) in an exogenous fertility setting. However, two important differences should be emphasized. First, the pension payment that an individual receives during her third period of life corresponds not only to the capitalized value of the education taxes the citizen contributed during her second period of life, as in Boldrin and Montes (2005) , but is also related to the number of descendants she had. Second, while in Boldrin et al. conditions (32) and (33) are necessary and sufficient to ensure that a programme (τ E , τ P , ϕ, 0)-i.e., with ρ ≡ 0-replicates the laissez-faire, complete market equilibrium (which is just one of all possible efficient allocations), in our case these conditions become necessary for such a programme to achieve efficiency. To see this, note that if the allocation a * * induced by a programme (τ E , τ P , ϕ, ρ) does not satisfy condition (33), then it does not satisfy the necessary condition for Millian efficiency in (23) either and, hence, it is not efficient (either statically or dynamically).
Since, in most economies, pensions are not linked to fertility decisions, while public education is, it is worth taking a closer look at welfare state programmes in which ρ ≡ 0. Consider the equilibrium induced by a programme (τ E , τ P , ϕ, 0) verifying (32) but not (33); that is, the rates of return to investments in physical and human capital are equal, but the rate of return to investments in children differs from the rate of return to other investments. Such an equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium generated by a complete set of financial markets and a programme for which intergenerational transfers are independent of fertility decisions. In particular, if pensions exceed the capitalized value of past investments in education, then the equilibrium induced by the welfare state coincides with the one induced by a complete set of financial markets and a balanced S-PAYG; and, symmetrically, if pensions are lower than the capitalized value of past investments in education, then the equilibrium induced by the welfare state coincides with the one induced by a complete set of financial markets and a (fertility independent) intergenerational policy that obliges each old agent to transfer resources to the middle-aged. This suggests that the welfare effects of alternative fertility policies might depend on whether pensions are higher or lower than the capitalized value of investments in public education.
In the analysis of alternative social security systems with complete markets, we have argued that an S-PAYG is Millian dominated by an F-PAYG (even when contributions to both programmes are the same), and that in order to reform an S-PAYG, contributions cannot be reduced in the first period of a reform that substitutes an S-PAYG with an F-PAYG. Therefore, if pensions exceed the capitalized value of past investments in education, then the equilibrium allocation is equivalent to the allocation resulting from an S-PAYG and a complete set of financial markets. As argued before, the number of individuals in an economy induced by an S-PAYG is too low, and introducing a policy that provides higher pensions to those having more children may thus be welfare improving. By a symmetric argument, when pensions are lower than the capitalized value of investments in education, then the direction of intergenerational transfers (with respect to a laissez-faire, complete market equilibrium), goes from members of a given generation to members of the following generation. In this case, the number of individuals induced by such an intergenerational policy might be too high, and a policy that penalizes fertility choices by reducing pensions for those having more children may thus be welfare improving.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies efficiency in an overlapping generations setting with endogenous fertility decisions. In this context, we explore the properties of an extension of the notion of Pareto efficiency, referred to as Millian efficiency. The notion of Pareto-dominance underlying Millian efficiency is based exclusively on the preference profiles of the agents that are alive, and exclusively allows one to rank symmetric allocations with positive fertility rates through every period.
We first show that, when fertility decisions are endogenous, the set of feasible allocations in overlapping generations economies is non-convex, and the standard characterizations of efficient growth paths cannot be directly applied. Next, we provide necessary (or static efficiency) conditions that every Millian efficient allocation must satisfy, as well as a sufficient condition determining whether a given allocation that satisfies these necessary conditions is Millian efficient (or dynamically M-efficient).
With these results at hand, we adapt the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics to our setting by characterizing every (statically) Millian efficient allocation as the equilibrium of a decentralized sequential price mechanism. Similar to the standard case, every Millian efficient allocation can be decentralized by selecting an appropriate sequence of intergenerational transfers and allowing the agents to determine their consumption and investment decisions at competitive prices. Unlike the standard case, an incentive scheme that links intergenerational transfers with fertility decisions is needed. More precisely, for every system of intergenerational transfers that achieves Millian efficiency, every middle-aged adult has to pay a tax (or, in some cases, receive a subsidy), and every old adult will receive a subsidy (or pay a tax) which depends linearly on the number of children she decided to have. As a particular case, we also show that the allocation corresponding to a decentralized equilibrium with no intergenerational transfers, for which there is no need to subsidize or tax children, is (statically) Millian efficient.
The paper also provides a detailed analysis of how public policy should be designed in different situations in which markets deliver inefficient allocations. When market failures are caused by dynamic inefficiencies, an active policy that increases fertility rates by providing higher pensions to those individuals with more descendants is welfare improving. When market failures are due to missing credit markets, fertility policies should be linked not only with social security, but also with public investment in education.
Our study, therefore, has relevant implications for analysing the role of fertility policies in achieving optimal intergenerational trade. First, empirical tests of dynamic efficiency based on the PKD criterion are no longer valid. Second, optimal intergenerational trade might be reached by spontaneous agreement of the agents involved. Third, if a government wishes to enforce intergenerational transfers, a mechanism linking these transfers to fertility decisions is required.
Several extensions, such as allowing heterogeneity among the agents of the same generation or including immigration decisions, would be worth exploring. The first extension seems relevant if agents differ in their labour capacities and rearing children requires time. In this case, a fertility-related social security system might bring higher benefits to those for whom fertility costs are lower, i.e., to those with lower labour capacities. The second extension might be useful to explore under what conditions admitting more foreigners may bring with it net welfare gains to all the people in a given country. Finally, another possibility for further research would be to allow more general forms of altruism between the agents and their descendants. In the setting with dynastic altruism studied by Barro and Becker (1989) , and under certain assumptions on preferences (seeÁlvarez, 1997), non-convexities and dynamic inefficiencies are absent in all equilibria with positive bequests. However, they might still be relevant for equilibria in which non-negativity constraints on bequests are binding, or in environments with weaker forms of altruism. These extensions would lead us to a better understanding of the role that some institutions, such as the family or the welfare state, play in achieving optimal intergenerational allocations. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Let (a * , (w * , R * )) be a decentralized equilibrium, and suppose (19) is satisfied. To prove that a * is dynamically efficient, we proceed by steps.
Step 
